Logic to randomness

When we observe a phenomenon, we try to understand it using logic. We sometimes forgo logic in certain domains of knowledge, for it is convenient. So is the case in physics, where fringe ideas have become the norm and provably impossible theories have become the acclaimed truth.

One such theory, which is parroted by the curious and the highly acclaimed physicists alike, is that randomness is fundamental to quantum physics. This claim is in direct contradiction to logic, as logic does not permit the existence of randomness in a true sense, else all known laws of logic would be broken. This has not stopped the idea from becoming a central tenet of modern physics, despite it not being fundamental in any important aspect. To be fundamental would mean that without the assumption of true randomness the quantum world would not work, or at least be different. Suffice to say, true randomness has no application, but only serves as a logical contradiction.

Randomness, in it's ultimate form, means that if we knew all the laws and the state of all things inside and outside the world, one would still not be able to determine the outcome of things. Nevertheless the world happens to know how to determines the outcome of things. It's a pending contradiction.

Young physicists point to Bell's inequality as evidence for 'true randomness' in quantum physics. For reasons unbeknownst to me, non-locality has been conflated and equated with randomness, despite those two being, in truth, not only unrelated, but also preferably not to be shoved into one statement. Non-locality is only a property of an abstract structure, while randomness is a concept rooted in fallacy.

It is as though you see two neighbors arguing, and then wrongly assert that the dog is the source of the noise, except a dog talking is more 'likely' than true randomness. That is because the latter is logically unsound, whilst the former isn't necessarily. And, as is supposedly true in Bell's inequality, we have succeeded in proving that which we already know to be false.

Because 'true randomness' is pushed by physicists to a degree not greatly differing from religious dogma, there have been theories that have been proposed in order to explain and understand its existence. Like the many-worlds interpretation, which presumes that all possible outcomes happen in different world-lines and that we only end up taking one world-line out of many at random. It's unclear how that is any different to saying that there are many possible outcomes, and you end up with one at random, or in short, how it's any different to randomness. Further, it is unclear how true randomness holds any importance in quantum physics: one could assume that all of it is deterministic, as it would logically be, and then admit that we don't have the knowledge to predict it. It would make no difference, but perhaps it could save us time on some of the fringe theories. Ironically, we attempt to apply logic to something illogical.

It is somewhat frightening that these theories have spread and been entrenched so deeply in modern physics. Worse is that physicists have no problem coming to strong yet unsound conclusions, partly due to these glaring holes in logic. But why is it that logic is used sometimes, and other times not? One can think up all the theories they want, but if it does not hold water logically, then it does not make sense. Full stop.

We are comfortable accepting things which cannot be true. Instead of trying to make sense of the quantum world, we assume it does not make sense, or needn't make sense, and then pride ourselves in it. We foster 'physical mysticism.' But it is without doubt that for whichever physics we discover, and whichever observations we make, that it is functionally impossible to prove them to be 'beyond logic.' Will you prove the impossible? Not a chance. So is the case when we call something truly random.

In short, physicists should not make dubious claims that only serves to muddy the water and promote a poorer understanding of physics. It would be of greater benefit if we always attempted to make our models logically sound, as models should be. Perhaps it would stir up greater discussion on how to understand the world around us, not swallow it.